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By David Hafemeister 
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:

Effectively Verifiable 
.. ,.. n October 1999, the U.S. Senate declined 
to consent to ratification of the 1996 
.. .... Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
Although the floor debate itself was so short as to 
be perfunctory, verification concerns played a role 
in the Senate's action. At the time, some senators 
contended that the treaty's verification provisions 
were inadequate to deal with potential cheating, 
despite assertions to the contrary by the White House. 
Since then, the Bush administration has 
refused to reconsider the CTBT, despite 
widespread, almost unanimous interna­
tional support for the pact. l 
co In the past year or two, however, there8 
N has been growing support across the U.S. 
~ political spectrum for Senate reconsidera­
o 
tl tion of the CTBT. A bipartisan group of 
o 
four senior statesmen, including former ~
o Secretaries of State George Shultz and 
~ Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of De­
...J 
o
a: fense William Perry, and former Senate 
f­
z 
o 
u 
(J) 
Armed Services Committee Chairman 
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), have called for the 
Senate to re-examine and ratify the treaty, 
which prohibits the conduct of any nu­
clear weapons test explosion or any other 
nuclear explosion anywhere.2 
The Democratic presidential nominee, 
Senator Barack Obama (IIl.), has also 
endorsed this caU. In a July 16 speech in 
Indianapolis, he said, "[W]e'll work with 
the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty and then seek its earliest 
possib.le entry into force." The Republi­
can presidential nominee, Senator John 
McCain (Ariz.), who voted against the 
treaty in 1999, said in a May 27 speech 
that if elected, he would "begin a dia­
logue with our allies, and with the U.S. 
Senate, to identify ways we can move for­
ward to limit testing in a verifiable man­
ner that does not undermine the security 
or viability of our nuclear deterrent. This 
would include taking another look at the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to see 
what can be done to overcome the short­
comings that prevented it from entering 
into force." How McCain might try to 
address perceived shortcomings on the 
verifiability of the CTBT is not clear. 
The high-level calls for CTBT reconsid­
eration reflect the growing recognition that 
renewed U.S. leadership on nuclear non­
proliferation and disarmament is needed 
to shore up the nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT). The CTBT has long been 
seen as a litmus test of the nuclear-weapon 
states' commitment to fulfilling their NPT 
Article VI commitment to end the arms 
race and pursue measures leading to nucle­
ar disarmament. As of Sept. 26, 2008, 180 
states have signed the CTBT and 145 have 
ratified, including all U.S. NATO allies. Iraq 
is the most recent signatory. However, the 
United States and eight other states, which 
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are necessary for CTBT entry into force, 
have not ratified the treaty. 
Since 1996, only three nations have de­
fied a de facto global nuclear test morato­
rium: India, North Korea, and Pakistan. In 
each case, the international community 
immediately and strongly condemned the 
tests. Moreover, international verification 
capabilities have been tested and found 
sufficient to verify compliance with the 
CTBT. A particularly noteworthy example 
occurred in October 2006 when the ex­
tensive network of sensors in the Interna­
tional Monitoring System (lMS) set up to 
monitor CTBT compliance easily detected 
a ,relatively low-yield (0.6 kiloton) nuclear 
test explosion by North Korea. This detec­
tion occurred even without the full spec­
trum of nuclear explosion verification and 
monitoring capabilities that would be pro­
vided for under the CTBT. These capabili­
ties include the possibility of short-notice, 
on-site inspections. 
When and if U.S. policymakers decide 
to reconsider the CTBT, they will find that 
CTBT entry into force would not only 
strengthen the norm against testing, but 
would increase the technical and legal ca­
pabilities to monitor, detect, and deter vio­
lations of the test ban norm. They will also 
discover that since the 1999 Senate vote 
on the CTBT, there have been significant 
improvements in technical verification 
capabilities:1 Together, these developments 
mean that few questions should remain 
about whether the CTBT meets the stan­
dard for "effective verification" as set down 
by top national security officials when the 
Senate considered and eventually support­
ed previous arms control treaties. 
How Much Verification Is 
Enough for Effective Verification? 
In his Sept. 22, 1997, letter transmitting 
the CTBT to the Senate, President Bill Clin­
ton wrote that "our National Intelligence 
Means, together with the Treaty's verifica­
tion regime and our diplomatic efforts, 
provide the United States with the means 
to make the CTBT effectively verifiable." 
A second attempt to convince a two­
thirds majority of the Senate that the CTBT 
is verifiable will depend in part on achiev­
ing a clear understanding of what effective 
verification means. The U.S. standard for 
effective verification of an arms control 
treaty was defined during Senate consider­
at.ion of ratification of the 1988 Intermedi­
ate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and 
rati­the 1991 START. During INF Treaty 
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fication hearings, Ambassador Paul Nitze 
defined effective verification: "[Ilf the other 
side moves beyond the limits of the treaty 
in any militarily significant way, we would 
be able to detect such violation in time to 
respond effectively and thereby deny the 
other side the benefit of the violation." 
Thus, cheating that could threaten U.S. 
national security in a militarily significant 
way must be detected in sufficient time. In 
the case of a nation that already has nuclear 
weapons, effective verification is deter­
mined by the military significance of the 
additionalnuc1ear-weapons capabilities it 
might obtain by cheating, beyond those it 
had before the treaty was in place. 
During the START ratification hearings, 
Secretary of State James Baker repeated the 
Nitze definition of effective verification but 
added a criterion: "Additionally, the veri­
fication regime should enable us to detect 
patterns of marginal violations that do not 
present immediate risk to U.S. security."4 
The intelligence community has a some­
what different approach based on statisti­
cal criteria. High-confidence verification, 
in the community's view, is the ability to 
detect 90 percent of the violations of treaty 
provisions. For the CTBT, this means the 
ability to detect 90 percent of nuclear tests 
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Figure 2: Identifying LowYield Explosions-The North Korean Example 
Seismograms of the October 9,2006 North Korean test show that nuclear explosions 
can be differentiated from earthquakes. The graphic below depicts seismograms 
recorded in northeast China from the North Korea nuclear test (top); from an earlier 
nearby earthquake (middle); and from a small chemical explosion (bottom). The nuclear 
test (magnitude 4, approximately 0.6 kilotons) can be distinguished from the earth­
quake (magnitude 4) by the fact that the nuclear test has stronger primary waves and 
weaker shear waves. The primary wave amplitude oscillates in the direction the wave 
travels, whereas the shear wave amplitude oscillates at right angles to the travel direc­
tion, such as a "wave" at a sporting event where people oscillate up and down but the 
wave travels horizontally. The nuclear test can be differentiated from a two-ton chemical 
explosion (magnitude 1.9) with a similar pattern of primary and shear waves by the 
fact that the chemical explosion's seismic signal at this station is of lower quality and is 
about fifty times smaller than the nuclear test. Combining seismic data with other tests, 
such as air sampling for radionuclides, indicates that nuclear explosions below 0.010 
kiloton yield (below 10 tons yield) could be detected in the region. 
Nuclear Test ""oN......""'..... 
9.7 ~/s "~.~~~II~I~VlAr.N't(1~.M~""''''''''''f,.373.1 km'I az= 6
2006/10109 baz=186 
M -4.0 
Earthquake 
11 Ills -.....-.-.,r."'-;_ llw~Wr~~~~II\W~~"""'I¥"/'I>\oI341.6 km~N az= 23 
2004/12/16 baz=204 
M 4.0 
Explosion 289.1 km 
0. 19 1l /s az= 14 
1998108119 baz""l94 
M 1.9. 2 ton 
. ,j I 
30 60 90 120 150 180 
Source Pdul Rld1clrtis cHlij \\0 I Yuunc Kill Sc'I..>rn" Slyr -Hurt' 
DI':i"II'llIWIII)ll ell Lo\', Yelo EOS 12007 1 
at a determined threshold! yield without 
regard to the military significance of any 
particular violation. Medium confidence 
implies 50 percent detection probability 
and low confidence implies 10 percent de­
tection probability. 
When a violation is suspected, the level 
of confidence in the monitoring data deter­
mines which adjectives are placed in front 
of "violation." The terminology reminds 
00 us of the judicial standards of beyond ao 
o 
N reasonable doubt (actual violation), prepon­
Q; 
.J) derance of the evidence (likely or probable
8 
o violation), and uncertain whether to pros­
a 
ecute (possible violation). ~
o It is important to correlate these statisti­
~ cal categories with considered judgments 
--' 
o of how yields and numbers of nuclear testII: 
.... 
Z explosions in violation of the CTBT would 
a 
u or would not affect the overall military bal­
CJ) 
ance or put U.S. security at risk and how2 
II: 
« it would affect the United States' ability to 
respond to such cheating. 
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CTBT Monitoring Progress Since 
the 1999 Senate Vote 
The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty bans 
nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer 
space, and underwater and! is verified solely 
by classified national means. In contrast, 
the CTBT bans nuclear testing everywhere, 
and it has extensive verification provisions. 
These include the lMS, consisting of remote 
sensors (seismic, radionuclide, hydroacous­
tic, and infrasound);' confidence-building 
measures; provisions for consultation and 
clarification; and, once the treaty enters 
possibilityinto force, the OSSibili  of short-notice, 
on-site inspections, as well as national 
means. CTBT verification concerns have 
primarily focused on possible cheating by 
underground testing. 
When the Senate considered the CTBT, 
some treaty critics suggested that it could 
only be monitored at testing levels of about 
one kiloton. This misperception arose in 
part from the fact that CTBT negotiators 
decided that the IMS should be designed 
to monitor nonevasive detonations above a 
threshold of about one kiloton anywhere in 
the world with high confidence. In reality, 
however, actual test ban verification ca­
pabilities were much better and have only 
improved since then. Not only have IMS 
monitoring technologies gotten better, but 
so have the capabilities of civilian seismic 
networks and national technical monitor­
ing systems.6 
Indeed, a 2002 panel of the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) determined that 
"underground nuclear explosions can be reli­
ably detected and can be identified as explo­
sions, using lMS data down to a yield of 0.1 
kilotons (l00 tons) in hard rock if conducted 
anywhere in Europe, Asia, North Africa and 
North America"? (see fig. 1). Advances in 
regional seismology have provided addi­
tional confidence. For some locations, such 
as Russia's former nuclear test site at Novaya 
Zemlya, the use of new seismic arrays and 
regionally located seismic stations has low­
ered the threshold to below 0.01 kilotons. 
As an example, take the 0.6-kiloton, 
North Korean test noted above. This nu­
clear explosion was promptly detected and 
identified from signals recorded at 31 seis­
mic stations in Asia, Australia, Europe, and 
North America, including 22 lMS stations 
established by the Preparatory Commis­
sion for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
Organization.8 The U.S. Geological Survey 
posted a good estimate of the test location 
five hours after the explosion occurred, 
Seismic data from underground chemi­
cal explosions show that far-lower-yield 
explosions would have been detected in 
the Korean region, as low as 0.002 kilotons 
in fact, a factor of 50 below the OJ-kiloton 
NAS monitoring threshold and a factor of 
500 below the nominal l-kiloton threshold 
(see fig. 2).9 The O.002-kiJoton threshold 
is not applicable everywhere, but it is evi­
dence that considerably lower limits can 
be obtained than previously assumed, 
particularly if there is a sufficient density of 
regional seismic stations. 
Regional monitoring is based on signals 
that have traveled via the earth's crust and 
upper mantle and have been recorded at 
distances up to about 1,500 kilometers. 
Better results are obtained with regional 
monitoring than with longer-range or 
teleseismic stations, which measure body 
waves that travel below the mantle. New 
algorithms, closer access, and seismic mod­
els enhance the ability to improve location 
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estimates and discriminate better among 
nuclear tests, earthquakes, chemical explo­
sions for mining, or other phenomena, For 
example, scientists have examined wheth­
er regional data from seismographs located 
at a distance of 500-1,500 kilometers could 
shed new light on 69 (out of 340) Soviet 
underground nuclear tests that took place 
at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakh­
stan during the Cold War but whose origin 
times, coordinates, and magnitudes had 
not been publicly determined, Using re­
gional data, scientists were able to provide 
information on all but two tests over 1 ton 
(0.001 kilotons), This achievement took 
place with seismographs employing old 
technology. Newer technology provides 
even more potential. lO 
Moreover, regional monitoring has been 
enhanced by the continued global expan­
sion of the lMS. As of Sept. 26, 2008, 233 
of the 337 IMS facilities were certified, 
30 were operational but not yet certified, 
36 were under construction, and 38 are 
planned. Since 89 percent of the lMS facili­
ties are now certified, operational, or under 
construction, it is reasonable to expect that 
95 percent of the IMS network will be com­
pleted in about five years. Additional data 
can be retrieved quickly from the 120-sta­
tion Auxiliary IMS network and from the 
vast Global Seismic Network. 
The IMS has also improved the ability 
to detect radionuclides that would be emit­
ted after a nuclear explosion by an order 
of magnitude. Forty of 80 radionuclide sta­
tions will be able to monitor for particulate 
and gaseous radionuclides, Radionuclides 
from the subkiloton North Korean test were 
detected in nearby South Korea and in dis­
tant Yellowknife, Canada, more than 7,000 
kilometers away. 
Experts have also been able to lower 
thresholds by comparing waveforms from 
two separate seismic events that are in close 
proximity. The small relative differences in 
the waveforms are used to reduce location 
uncertainties in seismically active regions 
by factors of 10 to 100, as compared to 
estimates based on arrival times of seismic 
waves. This is extremely useful at former 
test sites, and the technique is being ex­
tended to earthquake regions. 
A new detection technique, interfero­
metric synthetic aperture radar (lnSAR), is 
widely used by the United States, with its 
four Lacrosse satellites, as well as by the Eu­
ropean Space agency, Canada, and Japan, 
InSAR can measure the earth's subsidence 
(in many cases, to 2-5 millimeters accu­
racy) after a disruption, depending on the 
local situation. 1I InSAR is not used to mea­
sure nuclear yield but rather to pinpoint 
the location of the explosion to within 100 
meters, In addition, INSAR can discrimi­
nate between earthquakes and explosions 
on the basis of the symmetry of the subsid­
ence pattern. The detection threshold for 
InSAR is less than 1 kiloton at 500 meters 
depth for many locations if prior radar 
data is available, which is now frequently 
the case. Seismic data of a suspicious 
event can direct InSAR measurements to 
enhance the interpretation of the seismic 
proVidedata, and InSAR can v  much better 
location accuracy to direct on-site inspec­
tions of an ambiguous event, Its accuracy 
of 0,01 square kilometers is vastly better 
than the CTBT's allowed upper limit of 
1,000 square kilometers, 
Evasion Scenarios 
In its 2002 report, the NAS panel examined 
10 evasion scenarios suggested by the U.S, 
intelligence community, concluding that 
"the only evasion scenarios that need to 
be taken seriously at this time are cavity 
decoupling and mine masking,"12 The most 
commonly cited concern during the Senate 
debate was cavity decoupJing, which is the 
use of a cavity to muffle the seismic wave 
from a nuclear explosion, No country is 
known to have fully decoupled a nuclear 
explosion in a cavity that was created for 
that purpose, An explosion is fully decou­
pled if the cavity is large enough to reduce 
the nuclear blast pressure on the cavity wall 
below a critical level (the cavity radius to 
do this must be larger than 25 meters mul­
tiplied by the yield in kilotons to the 1/3 
power). The only fuJly decoupled nuclear 
test to do this displayed a yield that was 
reduced by a factor of 70. This was the 1966 
Sterling test with a yield of 0.38 kilotons in 
caVity,a 34-meter diameter Mississippi salt vi  
which had been produced from an earlier 
5.3-kiloton nuclear explosion, In 1976 the 
Soviet Union managed to partially decou­
ple by only a factor of 12 with a test in a salt 
cavity in Azgir. The 9-kiloton weapon was 
too large to fully decouple in the 72-meter 
diameter cavity, which had been created by 
an earlier 64-kiloton explosion, 
During the 1999 Senate debate, then­
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) 
mistakenly claimed that a 70-kiloton explo­
sion in a cavity could be hidden from [MS 
cav­monitoring, To do this would require a 
ity with a 200-meter diameter (equivalent 
to a 50-story building) with an area of 0,13 
square kilometers at a depth of 1 kilometer. 
No such cavity has ever been constructed, 
and it would be essentially impossible to 
construct one physically or to use such a 
hypothetical cavity with sufficient secrecy 
to hide a test. 
The NAS panel determined that an ex­
plosion in a cavity "cannot be confidently 
hidden if its yield is larger than 1 or 2" 
kilotons. The prospect that a country could 
cheat undetected fails to take into account 
that nowadays arrays of seismographs and 
other seismic capabilities can detect and 
identify many events that take place more 
than 2,000 kilometers away with yields 
considerably less than 1 kiloton, It also 
ignores advances in regional seismology 
(discussed below), One must also factor in 
the fact that, for example, 90 percent of 
underground Soviet tests at Novaya Zemlya 
vented radioactive debris, as did 40 percent 
of all Soviet tests.u Moreover, one must 
take into account that, for a successful 
clandestine test, the actual yield must be 
limited to the level predicted rather than a 
higher level (a "yield excursion"), This is a 
particularly difficult task for new nuclear­
weapon states, The panel noted that if an 
inexperienced state wanted to reduce the 
risk of detection, "it would probably try to 
limit test yields to 0,1 [kiloton] or less." 
Venting of rad ioactive gases is also a 
problem for any state that might consider a 
clandestine nuclear test. In fact, it is highly 
likely that a significant amount (more than 
0.1 percent) of radionuclides would be re­
leased and then detected by the IMS, The 
congressionaIOffice of Tech nology Assess­
ment reported in 1989, for example, that 
"since 1970, 126 [U.S.] tests have resulted 
in radioactive materials reaching the atmo­
sphere with a total release of about 54,000 
curies, Of this amount, 11,500 curies, 
roughly one-fifth were due to containment 
failure and late-time seeps,"14 Venting from P JJ 
smaller tests can be even more difficult s: Ul 
to contain, as the last four U,S. tests that (I 
o 
zvented had yields of less than 20 kilotons. 
--j 
Some scientists hypothesize that smaller oJJ 
r 
explosions may not sufficiently enclose --j 
o 
cavities with a glassil'ied cage to prevent o ~venting. Furthermore, the cavities may not 
o 
()rebound sufficiently to seal fractures with o 
a stress "cage," making venting more likely D" ~
possibilityand the OSSibili  of avoiding detection 
o 
even smaller. (Xl o 
op­In the 1999 Senate debate, treaty 
IV 
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ponents pointed to a classified 1996 CTBT 
National Intelligence Estimate and other 
intelligence community documents that 
made cavity cheating appear much too 
easy by not properly taking into account 
the six factors listed below. Even if each of 
• Practically all the radioactive gases 
and particles mmt be trapped. Ra­
dionuclide venting is a particularly 
serious risk for beginning nuclear­
weapon states. 
rellnainFevv questions should m i  about 
lIneetsvvhether the CTBT me  the standard 
for ··effective verification·· as set dovvn 
by top national security officials vvhen the 
Senate considered and eventually supported 
previous arms control treaties. 
these tasks could be carried out with high 
confidence of avoiding detection, there 
would only be a cumulative 50 percent 
chance of avoiding detection of one test 
and only a 15 percent chance that three 
tests could be carried out without detec­
tion. Yet, it is unlikely that a new nuclear­
weapon state even could do this well given 
the major technical hurdles. 
• Violators must be able to avoid 
yield excursions to prevent a planned 
clandestine test from being easily 
detectable. All first tests, including 
the early atmospheric tests if con­
ducted underground, would have 
been detectable by the IMS: United 
States (1945, 21 kilotons), Soviet 
Union (1949, 20 kilotons), United 
Kingdom (1952, 25 kilotons), France 
(1960,65 kilotons), China (1964, 22 
kilotons), India (1974, 12 kilotons), 
Pakistan (1998, 9 kilotons), North 
Korea (2006, 0.6 kilotons). 
00� • It is necessary to conceal from satel­o
N 
o lites materials removed to create a test
Q;
.0� shaft and cavity.
B 
u 
o 
• Crater and surface changes due to ~
o testing must be hidden from InSAR 
~ and other technologies. The 1998 
-' 
o� Indian and Pakistani test sites werea:�
z commercial�f­ easily located in SPOT  
o 
u images with 5-meter resolution. As 
Cf) 
noted above, surface subsidence of~
a: 
<:(� a few millimeters is observable in
many locations with InSAR. 
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• The cheater must avoid the detec­
tion of weaker seismic signals by re­
gional seismic stations and seismic ar­
rays. With the advent of more seismic 
stations in the world, this becomes 
more difficult. 
• The cheater must prevent the 
detection through national means. 
Human and other intelligence can 
provide other information that 
reveals test preparations. This in­
formation can be used by the CTBT 
Executive Council to authorize an 
on-site inspection. 
Would�What Kind of Cheating  
Matter?� 
principal�It should be kept in mind that the  
coun­�risk that needs to be avoided is that a 
strategic�try under the CTBT could alter the  
States.�balance betwee.n it and the United  
As noted above, the NAS study con­
cluded that it would be very difficult for 
states with less nuclear testing experience, 
such as India, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and 
Pakistan, to meet the required conditions 
to avoid detection by testing at 1 kiloton or 
less. It is far easier to test in the lO-kiioton 
range without a specific yield than to test 
at a specific small yield. The NAS study 
conduded that "Iclountries of lesser prior 
test experience and/or design sophistica­
tion" would also lack the sophisticated 
test-related expertise to obtain "limited 
improvement of efficiency and weight of 
unboosted fission weapons compared to 
test­1st-generation weapons not needing 
ing" from tests at levels of 0.01 kiloton to 
1-2 kilotons. ls 
The NAS panel also judged that "[s]tates 
with extensive prior test experience [Rus­
sia and Chinal are the ones most likely to 
be able to get away with any substantial 
degree of clandestine testing." For ex­
ample, with difficulty, these states could 
validate designs for unboosted fission 1­
kiloton weapons in a cavity. Yet, very-low­
yield tests by nUclear-weapon states, such 
as Russia and China, should not materi­
ally change the strategic balance by them­
selves. A 1995 JASON panel concluded 
that testing at 0.5 kilotons would provide 
only minimal gains in developing a new 
weapon design. 16 Moreover, at a mini­
mum, several clandestine tests are needed 
to change design parameters, improving 
the chance of detection. 
Net Benefit Analysis of Three 
CTBT Situations 
The NAS panel examined three global 
situations: with full compliance to the 
CTBT, without the CTBT, and with the 
CTBT with evasions by China, India, Iran, 
Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia. 
The NAS panel concluded that "[t]he 
worse-case scenario under a no-CTBT 
regime poses far bigger threats to U.S. 
security interests-sophisticated nuclear 
weapons in the hands of many more ad­
versaries-than the worst-case scenario 
of clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, 
within the constraints posed by the moni­
toring system."I? 
Our discussion has covered only tech­
nical issues in a world that is much more 
complex in its behavior. General John 
Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, examined the net benefit of 
the CTBT by examining all aspects, includ­
ing political ramifications for two worlds, 
with and without a CTBT. Shalikashvili's 
report suggested a mechanism for CTBT 
ratification in which the United States 
would "commit to conducting an intensive 
joint review of the Test Ban Treaty's net 
value for national security ten years after 
U.S. ratification, and at ten-year intervals 
thereafter. ... If, after these steps, grave 
doubts remain about the Treaty's net value 
for U.S. national security, the President, 
in consultation with Congress, would be 
prepared to withdraw from the Test Ban 
Treaty under the 'supreme national inter­
ests' clause."IK It is widely believed that 
the United States will not test a nuclear 
  
weapon because China and Russia would 
qUickly respond with multiple nuclear 
tests, leading to a new arms race. In addi­
tion, the prevailing wisdom in Washing­
ton is that the U.S. effort to halt nuclear 
proliferation would be greatly damaged if 
the United States tested. Thus, the United 
States is constrained by the CTBT, while 
not gaining the full benefits that would 
follow from the CrBT being in force. 
The CTBT Is Effectively Verifiable 
Table I displays the monitoring limits for 
the various CTBT sensor systems from the 
2002 NAS repoft and from other sources. 
As discussed above, cheating under the 
CTBT would be far from simple. Even if a 
country tested in a cavity and managed to 
carry out each of the six tasks identified 
above in such a way that the states might 
cer­have high confidence (90 percent 
tainty for each task) that each task would 
not be detected, the cumulative difficulty 
of hiding such a test would be consider­
able and almost insurmountable for more 
than one test. 
Still, to provide further assurance, ad­
ditional monitoring capabilities could be 
deployed at declared test sites to address 
extremely small tests, but only after CTBT 
ratification and then to be followed by fur-
Table 1:Tools for ComprehensiveTest BanTreaty Verification 
The following array of technologies and assets provides capabilities to detect potential violations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). They could be further enhanced with various means of national intelligence and monitoring, such as satellites. Together, these 
capabilities make the CTBT "effectively verifiable." 
Technology/Method� Description
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded this 
technology can detect explosions above 0.1 kilotons in 
Asia, Europe, North Africa, and North America. Inter­
national Monitoring System (lMS) arrays and regionalSeismic better.�seismology can do significantly  
yield�Tests conducted in cavities can be detected if their  
states�is greater than 1-2 kilotons for advanced nuclear  
states.�and at much lower levels for other  
explosions�The NAS says this technology can detect  
Southern�with a few kilograms of explosive yield in the  
for�Hemisphere and those explosions of less than 1 ton  
oceans.�all  
NAS says this technology can detect explosions with a� 
nuclear�yield of more than one kiloton for atmospheric  
ability�explosions (0.5 kilotons over continents), with the  
explo­�to discriminate between chemical and nuclear 
sions.� 
The NAS says this technology can detect tests with a� 
substantially�yield of 0.1-1 kiloton. This number has fallen  
which�in relation to radioactive particles and noble gases,  
detected�are keys to Interpreting nuclear tests. The IMS  
test�the 0.6-kiloton October 2006 North Korean nuclear  
kilometers.�at a distance of 7,000  
by�This technology can measure subsidence of the earth  
Using�as little as 0.2-0.5 centimeters in many locations.  
nuclear�InSAR, analysts can determine the location of a  
meters.�test within 100  
Executive�Any CTBT state-party can request the CTBTO  
inspection.�Council to conduct an on-site  
could�Aher the CTBT enters into force, states-parties  
such�agree to locate sensors at known test sites. With  
possible.�sensors, very low detection levels would be  
IMS Assets (When Completed) 
seismic�The IMS will use 50 primary and 120 auxiliary  
sta­�stations. In addition, 140 Global Seismic Network 
research�tions and more than 10,000 national and civilian  
that�seismographic stations will produce relevant data  
inspection�can be used to monitor and trigger an on-site  
Organi­�if so voted by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
CounCil�zation (CTBTO) Executive  
T-phase�The IMS will use six hydrophone arrays and five  
stations.�monitoring  
stations.�The IMS will use 60 infrasound monitoring  
par­�The IMS will use 80 monitoring stations to detect 
technical�ticles; 40 of these detect radio-xenon. National  
sensitiv­�means (NTM) sensors on airplanes have greater 
sensors�ity because they can fly close to the test. NTM  
sites.�can also be placed close to suspected test  
clas­�The United States can use this technology with four 
countries,�sified Lacrosse satellites. Canada, European  
utilized�and Japan also sell unclassified data that can be  
for this purpose. :l>� 
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The Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 
is responsible for establishing an International Monitoring System (lMS) to assist with 
verifying compliance with the CTBT. The IMS will span the globe with 321 monitoring 
stations consisting of four techno'iogies (seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infra­
sound). It includes the infrasound station, shown above, under installation in Kesra, Tunisia. 
ther negotiations. Cooperative monitoring 
near test sites can detect energy releases of 
less than 10 kilograms (0;00001 kilotons) 
by using passive-seismic, infrasound, and 
electromagnetic pulse sensors. Dosimeters 
placed 2 meters from experiments can 
detect very, very small fission and fusion 
yields of less than 1 gram-equivalent 
(0.000000001 kilotons). There is little 
military value from such low yield tests by 
themselves without folloWing with larger 
tests. Most importantly, undetected cheat­
ing at extremely low yields under the 
CTBT would at most provide only limited 
benefits that would not adversely affect 
the strategic balance. A worst-case analysis 
Sen­was carried out by myself for the 
ate Foreign Relations Committee for the 
Senate ratification report for START I, an 
ro 
o approach that was continued for START�
o 
N II ratification.l~ concluded�1'hose reports  
W� 
1:) that potential violations to START I and
o� 
U namely�II were not militarily significant, 
o 
that the Soviets (and then the Russians) ~
Cl would gain little with massive cheating in 
~ their ability to hurt U.S. strategic forces 
o --' � beyond what they could do without mas­II:� 
t­ �
Z� sive cheating. These results allowed the
o
u� Senate Foreign Relations Committee to
if) determine that START I and II were effec­~
II:a  
<l:� tively verifiable. By the same standard, the
CTBT is effectively verifiable. ACT
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